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The Battle of Karameh ((アラビア語:معركة الكرامة)) was a 15 hour military engagement between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and combined forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) in the Jordanian town of Karameh on 21 March 1968, during the War of Attrition.〔 It was planned by Israel as two concurrent raids on PLO camps, one in Karameh and one in the distant village of Safi — codenamed Operation Inferno ((ヘブライ語:מבצע תופת)) and Operation Asuta (מבצע אסותא), respectively — but the former turned into a full-scale battle. After the Six-Day War in 1967, the PLO and Fatah started to step up their guerrilla attacks against Israel from Jordanian soil taking the borderline Karameh town as their headquarters.〔 The goal of the invasion was to destroy Karameh camp and capture Yasser Arafat in reprisal for the attacks by the PLO, which culminated in an Israeli school bus hitting a mine in the Negev. However, plans for the two operations were prepared in 1967, 1 year before the bus incident. Files released by the IDF revealed that their army had practiced crossing the Jordan River in 1966 during the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank. When Jordan saw the size of the raiding forces entering the battle it was lead to the assumption that Israel had another goal of capturing Balqa Governorate to create a Golan Heights similar situation. Israel assumed that the Jordanian Army would ignore the invasion, but the latter fought alongside the Palestinians and opened heavy fire that inflicted losses upon the Israeli forces.〔 This engagement marked the first known deployment of suicide bombers by Palestinian forces.〔Saada, Tass & Merrill, Dean ''Once an Arafat Man: The True Story of How a PLO Sniper Found a New Life'' Illinois 2008 pp4-6 ISBN 1414323611〕 The Israelis were repelled at the end of a day's battle, having destroyed most of the Karameh camp and taken around 141 PLO prisoners.〔 The battle resulted in the issuance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 248, which condemned Israel for violating the cease-fire line. Both sides declared victory. On a tactical level, the battle went in Israel's favor〔Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy, University of Michigan Press, 2006, pages 244-246〕 and the destruction of the Karameh camp was achieved.〔Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars page 205〕 However, the relatively high casualties were a considerable surprise for the Israel Defense Forces and was stunning to the Israelis.〔 Although the Palestinians were not victorious on their own, King Hussein let the Palestinians take credit.〔 The Palestinians used this to establish their national claims.〔 King Hussein after the battle proclaimed, "I think we may reach a position where we are all fedayeen." However, afterwards the PLO's strength began to grow, and Palestinians spoke openly of taking over Jordan as part of Palestine. This situation eventually led to Black September in Jordan, in 1970.〔 ==Background== Following the seizure of the West Bank from Jordan in the June 1967 Six-Day War, Israel destroyed the existing Fatah networks there. In early 1968, however, Fatah guerrillas began raiding Israel from bases on the Jordanian side of the river. Most of these attacks were blocked by the IDF. At times, Jordanian Army infantry and artillery units gave the Fatah squads covering fire, leading to frequent direct skirmishes between the IDF and the Jordanian Army.〔 On 14–15 February, Jordanian mortars hit several Israeli settlements in the Beit Shean Valley and Jordan Valley. Israeli artillery and air forces retaliated against Jordanian bases and artillery batteries, as well as the American-financed East Ghor Canal (now known as the King Abdullah Canal). As a result, thousands of Jordanian farmers fled eastwards, and fedayeen moved into the valley. An American-sponsored ceasefire was arranged, and King Hussein declared he would prevent these groups from using Jordan as a base for attack.〔Morris (1999), pp. 367–368〕 In February, he sent twenty carloads of troops and police to order a Fatah unit to leave Karameh. When it arrived, the column found itself surrounded by men wielding machine guns; their commander said "You have three minutes to decide whether you leave or die". They withdrew.〔 By March, several hundred civilians lived in the camp, along with about 900 guerrillas, mostly from Fatah, and PLO leader Yasser Arafat, who had his headquarters there.〔Morris (1999), p. 368〕 In Israel, Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate Aharon Yariv stated that a raid would damage Fatah's prestige. On the other hand, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and his chief of bureau Gideon Rafael — mindful of an adverse American reaction — worried a raid could result in innocent civilian deaths and be a political disservice to Israel. Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) Haim Bar-Lev promised a "clean action". Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked for a "principal approval" for a raid, but this was denied by the cabinet. He warned the other ministers that a bus might strike a mine. On 18 March, an Israeli school bus was blown up by a mine near Be'er Ora in the Arava, killing two adults and wounding ten children.〔 This was the 38th Fatah operation in little more than three months.〔 That night, the cabinet approved the attack. The U.S. tried to prevent it by forwarding Israel a message from King Hussein. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol called in the cabinet for further counseling; only the National Religious Party leader Haim-Moshe Shapira vocally opposed it, while Education Minister Zalman Aran opposed it but remained silent.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Karameh」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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